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NO EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY: SHOULD SCHOOL OFFICIALS
BE ABLE TO SEARCH STUDENTS' LOCKERS WITHOUT ANY SUSPICION OF WRONG DOING? A STUDY OF IN RE PATRICK Y. AND
ITS EFFECT ON MARYLAND PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a recent study, the Federal Bureau of Investigation estimated that
nearly 100,000 students carry guns to school every day. 1 Although the
odds of a student being murdered in school are less than the odds of
being struck by lightening, the chance that a student will be the victim
of a serious crime is about one in two hundred. 2 Because of the increase in school violence, school authorities should be able to search a
student's school locker in order to protect the other students. However, this authority to search should not be unlimited. School administrators should only be able to search a students' locker when they
have a reasonable suspicion of the student's wrongdoing.
The intrusion of a student's right to privacy should not be without
legal limitations. Millions of students go to school everyday with no
weapons. Most students expect that while they are in class, their belongings will be left alone. 3 If there is no standard required before
school officials may gain access to the lockers, students' belongings
will be subject to search anytime they are placed in a locker. 4
The schools' interest in keeping students safe is undoubtedly compelling, but there must be a balance between this interest and the
students' interest in privacy. Schools must maintain order, but students need to be given some freedom to bring personal belongings
without constant fear that school authorities will be looking through
their things. 5 As stated by the United States Supreme Court, "the situl. Charles Patrick Ewing, Special to The News, Why Violence in Schools Cannot
Be Tolerated; Zero-Tolerance Policies Have Led to Absurd Situations in a Few Rare
Cases, but Growing Crime in Schools Suggests that Even Seemingly Minor Incidents
Must be Dealt with Swiftly and Severely, BuFF. NEws, Sept. 10, 2000, at IF.
2. !d.
3. See State ex rel T.L.O., 463 A.2d 934, 943 (NJ. 1983), rev'd fry New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (stating that a student's school locker "is a
home away from home" and that the student had a privacy interest in his
personal belongings in the locker).
4. See Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662, 665 (lOth Cir. 1981).
5. See George M. Dery, III, The Coarsening of Our National Manners: The Supreme
Court's Failure to Protect Privacy Interests of School Children- Vernonia School
District 47] v. Acton, 29 SuFFOLK U. L. REv. 693, 734 (1995). The author,
quoting Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 23 F.3d 1514, 1527 (9th Cir. l 994), vacated fry Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47jv. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), points out that,
until recently, the Supreme Court understood that keeping constitutional
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ation is not so dire that students ... may claim no legitimate expectations of privacy." 6
In Maryland, school officials now have unlimited authority to access
and search students' lockers. 7 The recent Court of Appeals of Maryland decision, In re Patrick Y., 8 held that a student does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his locker; thus, lockers can be
subject to a search by school officials without any level of suspicion. 9
The court in Patrick Y. held that, although the school had a policy that
lockers would not be searched without probable cause, the policy was
invalid because it was different than the state statute, 10 which required
no standard of suspicion. 11 The school policy was adopted by the
school and signed by the student and parents. 12 By setting forth a
requirement of probable cause as the standard upon which lockers
would be searched, the policy may have provided students with a basis
for having a reasonable expectation of privacy in their lockers. 13
This Comment will describe how the Court of Appeals of Maryland
has severely impacted the Fourth Amendment rights of students
through its decision in In re Patrick Y. 14 First, Part II of this Comment
will give a brief overview of the Fourth Amendment. 15 Next, Part III
will provide a history of cases dealing with student searches, beginning

6.

7.

8.
9.

10.
11.

12.
13.
14.
15.

righ,t;: intact involves living" 'with a certain amount of discomfort, even danger.
!d.
Newjerseyv. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,338 (1985) (noting that prisoners retain
no expectation of privacy in their cells because of a need to maintain order,
but that public schools do not need to be equated with prisons for Fourth
Amendment purposes).
See In re Patrick Y., 358 Md. 50, 67, 746 A.2d 405, 414 (2000) (holding that a
student had no expectation of privacy in his locker because of state law that
provided that school lockers were subject to search by school officials in the
same manner as other school property).
358 Md. 50, 746 A.2d 405 (2000).
!d. at 67, 746 A.2d at 414. The court stated that "[a]s petitioner could have
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the school locker, the search of it
by the school security officer ... did not violate any Fourth Amendment
right of petitioner." !d.
Mo. ConE ANN., Eouc. § 7-308 (1999); see also Patrick Y., 358 Md. at 66, 746
A.2d at 414.
The school policy stated that a school official "'may conduct a search of a
student's locker if there is probable cause to believe that the student has in
his/her possession'" an item of contraband. Patrick Y., 358 Md. at 52-53,
746 A.2d at 406-07. However, section 7-308 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, Education Article provided that a school administrator may search
the school "and its appurtenances including the lockers of students," but
required that this right to search must "be announced or published previously in the school." Mo. ConE ANN., Eouc. § 7-308 (b).
Patrick Y., 358 Md. at 52, 746 A.2d at 406.
See id. at 73-74, 746 A.2d at 418 (Bell, CJ., dissenting).
See infra Part V.
See infra Part II.A.
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with the landmark decision of New jersey v. T.L. 0. 16 Additionally, Part
III will examine other jurisdictions' treatment of locker searches. 17
Part IV of this Comment will focus on how Maryland courts have
historically treated searches of students. 18 Most significantly, Part IV
will address the effect of In re Patrick Y. on Maryland law: that school
officials in Maryland can search a student's locker without any suspicion of wrongdoing. 19
Finally, Part V of this Comment will argue that students in Maryland
should not be subject to standardless searches. 20 Part V will argue that
instead of standardless searches, reasonable suspicion should be required before school officials may search school students' lockers. 21
This argument is based upon (1) similar cases in other jurisdictions; 22
(2) the school policy; 23 (3) the Court of Appeals of Maryland's failure
to apply the entire statute in their holding; 24 and ( 4) the more persuasive rationale offered by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in
its holding in In re Patrick Y. 25
II.

PROTECTION AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AN
SEIZURES: THE FOCUS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

A.

An Examination of the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures by public officials. 26 Enforced against the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, 27 the bedrock principle of the
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

469 U.S. 325 ( 1985); see also infra Part liLA.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.C.
See infra Part V.D.
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
27. U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV. "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... " !d.; see also Jennifer Barnes, Comment, Students
Under Seige? Constitutional Consideration for Public Schools Concerned with School
Safety, 34 U. RicH. L. REv. 621, 631 (2000) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 655 (1961)). Mapp v. Ohio held that the Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp, 367 U.S. at
655.
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Fourth Amendment is the "recognition of 'the right to be let alone the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."' 28 The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
government intrusions on an individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy. 29 In Katz v. United States, 30 the Supreme Court first interpreted the Fourth Amendment to provide protection of an individual's reasonable expectation ofprivacy. 31 Prior to Katz, determination
of a Fourth Amendment violation focused solely on an analysis of the
area searched. 32 According to the cases before Katz, only "constitutionally protected areas" were covered by the Fourth Arnendment. 33
However, the Court in Katz broadened the scope of the Fourth
Amendment and rejected the previous precedent by stating that "the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." 34
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan coined the term a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" to describe an area subject to the protection of
the Fourth Arnendment. 35 Justice Harlan articulated a two-pronged
test to determine whether Fourth Amendment protection applies. 36
First, a person must "have exhibited an actual ... expectation of privacy" and, second, society must recognize the expectation as reasonable.37 Absent a subjective and objective expectation of privacy, the
28. Newjerseyv. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,362 (1985) (Brennan,]., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
29. JoN M. VAN DYKE & MELVIN M. SAKuRAI, CHECKLISTS FOR SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES IN Pusuc SCHOOLS § 1.2 at 1-2 (West Group 2000) (interpreting
the view set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 ( 1967)).
30. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
31. Id. at 360-61. Katz changed the Fourth Amendment analysis from a focus
on the place searched to a determination of whether the individual sought
to keep the searched item or place private. Id. at 351-52.
32. Id. at 351 n.9.
33. Id. at 351 n.8 (noting that previous courts have determined that an individual's home is a constitutionally protected area, but that an open field is
not).
34. Id. at 351 (noting that what a person seeks to keep private, even in public,
may be constitutionally protected).
35. !d. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 361.
37. !d. A subjective "expectation of privacy" refers to that which a person seeks
to keep as private. Id. For example, a person in his or her home expects
privacy. Id. Because society also recognizes this subjective expectation as
reasonable, this person has an expectation of privacy in their home for
Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. On the other hand, in public, a person
would not expect privacy if the general public could witness his or her activities or conversations because these activities would be exposed to the general public. Id. Additionally, society would not recognize as private what a
person exposes in public. Id. Therefore, without a subjective or objective
privacy expectation, there will be no Fourth Amendment protection given
to this person for what they expose to the public. Id.
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Fourth Amendment is not applicable because a search has not taken
place. 38
Once a court determines that a search has taken place, there are
two interpretations used by courts to decide whether the search was
reasonable. 39 First, the scope of reasonableness is formulated by balancing the "'need to search against the invasion which the search entails.' "40 This "conventional" view establishes a presumption that
without a warrant exception41 or a warrant based on probable cause, 42
a search is unreasonable. 43
Second, some courts have adopted a "general reasonableness"
test. 44 The general reasonableness test is based on the distinction between the warrant requirement and the reasonableness requirement
38. Stuart C. Berman, Note, Student Fourth Amendment Rights: Defining the Scope of
theT.L.O. School Search Exception, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1077, 1083 n.24 (1991).
If the behavior does not rise to the level of a search or seizure, "the law does
not give a constitutional damn" whether the conduct complies with the
Fourth Amendment. /d. (citing Moylan, The Fourth Amendment Inapplicable
vs. The Fourth Amendment Satisfied: The Neglected Threshold of "So What?", 1 S.
ILL. u. LJ. 75, 76 (1977).
39. See id. at 1084; VAN DvKE, supra note 29, § 1.2 at 1-2 (noting that governmental conduct considered to be a search must be reasonable according to
the Fourth Amendment); see also U.S. CaNST. amend. IV. "The right of
people to be secure ... against unreasonable searches .... " /d. (emphasis
added). Reasonable searches are constitutionally permissible. See id.
40. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court of City & County
of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)).
41. Berman, supra note 38, at 1084 n.33. Warrant exceptions include automobile searches; items in plain view, inventory searches, searches incident to
arrest, administrative searches, hot pursuit searches, and border searches.
See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982) (holding that a warrantless police search of a drug dealer's vehicle was justified based on probable
cause because packages inside the vehicle could reasonably contain narcotics); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976) (ruling that a
search warrant was unnecessary for the seizure of marijuana by police during a routine inventory of an impounded vehicle); United States v. Santana,
427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (ruling that a warrant is unnecessary to seize evidence resulting from a police pursuit that began in a public place and ended inside the suspect's home); Almeida-sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
266, 272 (1973) (holding that routine searches by government agents at an
international border, or its fundamental equivalent, may be conducted
without a search warrant); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 3ll, 316 (1972)
(holding that a warrantless search of a locked storeroom during business
hours was reasonable and the resulting seizure of unlicensed firearms was
not a violation of the Fourth Amendment); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 762-63 (1969) (holding that an arresting officer may make a search of
the arrestee and the area within the arrestee's immediate control).
42. Probable Cause is defined as "[a] reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or is committing a crime or that a place contains specific items connected with a crime." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1219 (7th ed.
1999).
43. See Berman, supra note 38, at 1084-85.
44. /d. at 1086.
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of the Fourth Amendment. 45 Courts that have used this test weigh the
governmental need to conduct the search against the intrusion to the
person's expectation of privacy to determine the validity of the
search. 46 This analysis has been used by the United States Supreme
Court in limited cases involving special governmental needs, 47 administrative searches, 48 and school settings. 49

B.

Application of the Constitution to Children

The Supreme Court has generally recognized that the Constitution
affords rights to children. 50 However, the Court has expressed that
although children possess these constitutional rights, they are limited.
For example, in Bellotti v. Baird, 51 a case dealing with the constitutionality of a statute requiring minors to obtain parental consent before
having an abortion, Justice Powell opined that there are:
[T]hree reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of
adults: the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability
to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner;
and the importance of the parental role in child rearing. 52
Although Justice Powell expressed this opinion, the Court still held
that the statute was unconstitutional. 53 The Court noted that the pro45. /d.
46. /d.; Nat'! Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66
(1989) (noting that when there is a special governmental need, the individual's privacy expectations are balanced against the government's interest to
determine whether a warrant is impractical); see also infra Part liLA.
47. Berman, supra note 38, at 1087 n.42. This author notes that "where a
Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond
the normal need for law enforcement ... it is necessary to balance the
individual's privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context." /d. (quoting Von Raab, 489
U.S. at 665-66); see also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987)
(analogizing the operation of a state's probation system with the operation
of its schools as being special needs situations); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480
U.S. 709, 725-26 (1987) (holding that a state government's intrusions on
the privacy interests of its employees for work-related reasons are permissible based on the special needs exception).
48. Berman, supra note 38, at 1087. An administrative search is defined as "[a]
search of public or commercial premises carried out by a regulatory authority for the purpose of enforcing compliance with health, safety, or security
regulations." BucK's LAw DICTIONARY 1351 (7th ed. 1999).
49. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
50. Janet McDonald, Comment, New Jersey v. T.L.O. - Closing the School House
Gate on the Fourth Amendment, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 455, 460
(1986).
51. 443 u.s. 622 (1979).
52. /d. at 634.
53. /d. at 651.
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tection of the constitution extends to children, 54 and that to require
consent before having an abortion would place an undue burden on a
minor to exercise this right. 55 Thus, although the rights of children
are limited, they are actual rights.
The Court also considered the constitutional rights of children in
In re Gault. 5 6 This case involved a fourteen-year-old child charged with
making obscene phone calls. 5 7 At trial, the teenager was sentenced to
incarceration until the age of twenty-one. 58 The juvenile had never
received notice of the charges against him, of his right to counsel, or
of his right to cross-examine witnesses. 59 However, an adult charged
with the same crime would have been given such notice and rights,
and would have only received a small fine or a short jail term. 60 The
Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment gives children due process rights. 61
Furthermore, the Court in Tinker v. Des Moines School District 62 recognized that children have First Amendment rights. 63 In Tinker, students who were suspended for wearing black armbands to protest the
Vietnam War alleged that the suspension was a violation of their First
Amendment rights. 64 The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the
suspension of the students violated their right to free speech because
the armbands did not interfere with the school's interests. 65 In its
holding, the Court balanced the students' right of free speech against
54. I d. at 633. The Court asserted that "[a] child, merely on account of his
minority, is not beyond the protection of the Constitution." Id.
55. Id. at 647. The Court stated, "[w]e think that, construed in this manner,
[section] 12S would impose an undue burden upon the exercise by minors
of the right to seek an abortion." Id.
56. 387 u.s. 1 (1967).
57. Id. at 4. Gault's neighbor complained to the police about lewd telephone
calls that she received. Police subsequently arrested Gault and took him to
the Children's Detention Home. Id.
58. Id. at 7-8.
59. Id. at 9-10.
60. Id. at 8-10. The child was charged with violating section 13-377 of the Arizona Revised Statutes. /d. at 8. The penalty that would apply to an adult
would range from $5.00 to $50.00, or less than two months imprisonment.
Id. at 8-9. The juvenile Code did not have provisions requiring notice, right
to counsel, and privilege against self-incrimination; these rights are guaranteed to all persons under the Constitution. Id. at 10.
61. See id. at 59. The Court stated that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment
nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." Id. at 13.
62. 393 u.s. 503 (1969).
63. I d. at 506. The Court opined that "[i] t can hardly be argued that ... students ... shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Id.
64. Id. at 504 (noting that the petitioners filed their complaint under the Civil
Rights Act).
·
65. Id. at 514 (noting that "[t]hey caused discussion outside of the classrooms,
but no interference with work and no disorder. In these circumstances,
our Constitution does not permit officials of the state to deny their form of
expression.").
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the need of the school to maintain discipline and safety within the
school, and ultimately held that the students' right to free speech outweighed any governmental interest. 66
Additionally, the Court addressed students' Fourteenth Amendment protection in Goss v. Lopez.. 67 In Goss, students staged a demonstration in the school auditorium during a class, with their behavior
ranging from disruptive to violent. 68 Consequently, the school suspended the students for up to ten days. 69 Because the students were
not afforded a hearing prior to the suspension, the Court found that
there was a due process violation. 70 Thus, the Court held that the
State had the authority to enforce discipline by creating regulations,
but that in executing these regulations, the schools must afford due
process rights to the student. 71
It is clear that the Constitution applies to children and to adults. 72
However, because schools need to enforce rules and disci~line, childrens' constitutional rights are limited within the schools. 3 Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment rights of students are limited within
schools because of the schools' responsibility to maintain a safe environment. 74 As a result, Fourth Amendment rights of minors are not
as strong as the rights of adults when there is a government interest at
stake, such as the protection of children in a school's custody. 75
When children set foot onto school grounds, their constitutional
rights become limited. These rights, however, do not disappear
entirely.

66. ld.
67. 419 u.s. 565 (1975).
68. ld. at 569-70. One of the students, Tyrone Washington, was demonstrating
in the school auditorium and refused to leave. Id. A police officer attempted to remove Tyrone, and another student, Randolph Sutton, attacked the police officer. Id. at 570. Other students were suspended for
similar misconduct, including a disturbance in the lunchroom resulting in
damage to school property. Id.
69. ld. at 568.
70. !d. at 579. The Court concluded that a student should be given "some kind
of notice and afforded some kind of hearing." ld. (emphasis added).
71. ld. at 574. The Court noted that they did "not believe that school authorities must be totally free from notice and hearing requirements if their
schools are to operate with acceptable efficiency." ld. at 581.
72. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
73. See Barnes, supra note 27, at 631.
74. See VAN DYKE, supra note 29, § 1.6, at 1-13.
75. See id.
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SCHOOL SEARCHES: FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT OF
CHILDREN IN SCHOOL SETTINGS
New Jersey v. T.L.O. -A Landmark Decision

New jersey v. T.L. 0. 76 was the first Supreme Court case to address
school students' Fourth Amendment rights. 77 The Court in T.L.O.
held that the Fourth Amendment protects students against searches
and seizures by school officials. 78 According to the Court, a determination of reasonableness is made by balancing the interests of the
child's expectation of privacy with the schools' interest in maintaining
a safe, educational environment. 79 This poses a situation with competing interests: the child has the right to bring items to school that
are private, 80 but school officials must be able to maintain discipline
and order in the school. 81 Additionally, to maintain discipline and
order within the schools, school regulations must be flexible, immediate, and effective. 82
Because of these competing interests, the Court opined that the restrictions on searches by school officials needed to be relaxed for the
school setting. 83 Thus, the Court held that school officials need not
adhere to the probable cause or warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment when conducting a search. 84 Instead, the Court instituted a two-prong test to determine whether a search was reasonable:
(1) "'whether the ... action was justified at its inception,"' 85 and (2)
76. 469 u.s. 325 (1985).
77. See Berman, supra note 38, at 1077.
78. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42, 347-48; see also Berman, supra note 38, at 1090
n.68. Prior to T.L.O., the standard governing searches of students was the
in loco parentis (in place of the parent) doctrine. !d. This doctrine rested
on the notion that school officials acted in the place of the parent while the
child was at school, thereby not restricting the school officials to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. /d. The Court rejected this concept
and held that school officials are government agents for the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment. /d.
79. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339.
80. /d. (noting that students may bring to school items other than school supplies, such as keys, items for personal hygiene, letters, diaries, photographs,
and other personal items).
81. /d.
82. /d. at 339-40. The Court recognized that "' [e]vents calling for discipline
are frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action."' /d. at 339 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975)).
83. /d. at 340 (noting that "maintaining security and order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures, and
we have respected the value of preserving the informality of the studentteacher relationship").
84. /d. at 340-41. Justice White argued that to require a warrant would "interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures
needed" to preserve school order. ld. at 340.
85. /d. at 341 (alteration in original) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20
(1968)).
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whether the search was reasonably permissible in its scope. 86 The
search will be "justified at its inception'" if officials have reasonable
suspicion that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. 87
A search is permissible in scope when the method taken to effectuate
the search is not more intrusive than needed, taking into account the
seriousness of the infraction and the age and sex of the student. 88
Because the question of locker searches was not before the Court in
T.L.O., it did not make a determination as to whether this standard
was applicable to schoollockers. 89 However, nearly every post-T.L.O.
school search case has followed the rationale set forth by T.L.0. 90
86. Id. at 341-42.
87. Id. at 342.
88. Id. Compare People v. Dukes, 580 N.Y.S.2d 850, 852-53 (1992) (holding that
a search by means of a metal detector is reasonable because it is not intrusive) with Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92-93 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that a
dog sniff of a thirteen-year-old girl, followed by a nude search was unreasonable) and Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that a strip search of a fifth grade class in a search for $3.00 was more
intrusive than necessary).
89. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 n.5. The Court also did not decide whether the
exclusionary rule was the appropriate remedy for an illegal search, or
whether police searches are also afforded the reasonable suspicion standard. Id. at 337 n.5, 341 n.7. The premise of the exclusionary rule is that
all evidence obtained from searches and seizures that violate the Constitution is inadmissible, and thus "excluded" from being admitted as evidence.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
90. Berman, supra note 38, at 1099 n.ll9; see, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (following T.L.O. in upholding drug urinalysis
of high school sports teams); DesRoches v. Caprio, 156 F.3d 571 (4th Cir.
1998) (following T.L.O. in determining that the search of a student's
backpack was reasonable); Thompson v. Carthage Sch. Dist., 87 F.3d 979
(8th Cir. 1996) (following T.L.O. in upholding a search of students by a
metal detector); Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist., 991 F.2d 1316 (7th
Cir. 1993) (following T.L.O. analysis in upholding a strip search of a student as reasonable); Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991)
(following T.L.O. analysis in upholding school administrators strip search
of a student); Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1987) (upholding
search of a student by following T.L. 0. 's reasonableness standard); Wynn v.
Bd. of Educ., 508 So. 2d 1170 (Ala. 1987) (following T.L.O. standard in
upholding the search of a fifth grade student as not being excessively intrusive); State v. Serna, 860 P.2d 1320 (Ariz. 1993) (applying T.L.O. in upholding a search); In reWilliam G., 709 P.2d 1287 (Cal. 1985) (following T.L.O.
in holding that the search conducted by the vice principal was unreasonable); In re P.E.A., 754 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1988) (following T.L.O. in holding
that the search of a student's car was reasonable); In re Doe, 887 P.2d 645
(Haw. 1994) (following T.L.O. in upholding the reasonableness of the
search of a student's purse); People v. Pruitt, 662 N.E.2d 540 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996) (following T.L. 0. in upholding the reasonableness of the seizure of a
gun from a student); SA v. State, 654 N.E.2d 791 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)
(following T.L.O. in upholding the search of a student's bookbag as reasonable); In re L.A., 21 P.3d 952 (Kan. 2001) (applying T.L.O. in upholding the
search of a student's backpack and ballcap); State v. Barrett, 683 So. 2d 331
(La. Ct. App. 1996) (following T.L.O. in determining that a search was unreasonable); Commonwealth v. Damian D., 752 N.E.2d 679 (Mass. 2001)
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Therefore, because the Court did not consider the issue of locker
searches, states have addressed the issue in statutes or court
decisions. 91
B.

School Locker Searches

Whether a school locker search falls within the parameters of the
Fourth Amendment is determined by whether state courts find that
students have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their lockers. 92
Some jurisdictions have held that students possess a privacy interest in
their lockers, 93 while others have held that students do not. 94 Finally,

91.

92.
93.
94.

(using T.L.O. analysis in determining that the search of a student was unreasonable); In re Patrick Y., 358 Md. 50, 746 A.2d 405 (2000) (using T.L.O.
in its analysis); S.C. v. State, 583 So. 2d 188 (Miss. 1991) (applying the
T.L.O. standard to a locker search); State v. Drake, 662 A.2d 265 (N.H.
1995) (applying T.L.O. to uphold the search of a student); State v. Moore,
603 A.2d 513 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (using T.L.O. to uphold the
reasonableness of the search of a student's book bag); State v. Michael G.,
748 P.2d 17 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (using T.L.O. to uphold a locker search
as reasonable); In re Gregory M., 627 N.E.2d 500 (N.Y. 1993) (upholding
the search of a student's bag as reasonable); In re Murray, 525 S.E.2d 496
(N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (using T.L.O. to uphold the search of a student as
reasonable); In re Adam, 697 N.E.2d llOO (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (using
T.L.O. to uphold the search of a student's locker as reasonable); State ex rel.
Juvenile Dept. of Lincoln County v. Finch, 925 P.2d 913 (Or. Ct. App.
1996) (holding that the search of a student's jacket was unreasonable based
on T.L.O. analysis); Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350 (Pa. 1998) (using
T.L.O. analysis to determine the reasonableness of a locker search); Shoemaker v. State, 971 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. App. 1998) (using T.L.O. to determine the reasonableness of the search of a student's locker); State v. B.A.S.,
13 P.3d 244 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (using T.L.O. analysis in determining
that the search of a student was unreasonable); State v. Joseph T., 336
S.E.2d 728 (W.Va. 1985) (applying T.L.O. to locker searches); In re Angelia
D.B., 564 N.W.2d 682 (Wis. 1997) (holding that the T.L.O. reasonableness
test applied).
See VAN DYKE, supra note 29, at§ 10.1, at 10-1 to 10-2. For example, Mississippi courts decided that students do have a privacy expectation in their
lockers. South Carolina v. State, 583 So. 2d 188, 191-92 (Miss. 1991). Additionally, New Mexico, Washington, and West Virginia have also determined
that students possess a privacy interest in their lockers. See Michael G., 748
P.2d at 19; State v. Brooks, 718 P.2d 837, 840 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986);joseph
.
T., 336 S.E.2d at 736.
For a discussion of different jurisdictions' treatment of locker searches, see
infra Part III.B.1-2.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Part III.B.l. See generally People v. Overton, 249 N.E.2d 366, 369
(N.Y. 1969) (indicating that students have no expectation of privacy in a
locker because school officials retain control over the locker); Shoemaker,
971 S.W.2d at 182 (holding that a student did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in her locker based upon the school policy, lockers being
school property, and the possession of a master key by the principal); In re
Isiah B., 500 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Wis. 1993) (holding that the student did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his locker because of the school
policy).
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some jurisdictions base a student's expectation of privacy on the policies of the student's school. 95
1. Jurisdictions Finding No Expectation of Privacy in School Lockers

There are few cases that have held that a student has no expectation
of privacy in his or her locker. 96 Generally, there are three theories
that courts have given to uphold this view. 97
First, courts have reasoned that because school officials have a
master key, even if a student has a subjective expectation of privacy
within their locker, it is diminished by the awareness that a school
official could open his or her locker at anytime. 98 However, even if
students are aware of a master key, it may not mean that they expect it
will be used without reason. 99
Second, courts have reasoned that students do not have an expectation of privacy in their lockers because lockers are viewed as school
property. 100 Because the lockers are on the property of the school
95. See Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662, 671 (lOth Cir. 1981) (holding that
students had no expectation of privacy within their lockers because of the
school policy of retaining control over the lockers); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1366 (Mass. 1992) (holding that the school policy,
which outlined that students' lockers would not be searched unreasonably,
gave students a reasonable expectation of privacy in their lockers); South
Carolina v. State, 583 So. 2d at 191-92 (holding that the Mississippi Constitution gave students a legitimate expectation of privacy within their lockers); Isiah B., 500 N.W.2d at 641 (holding that the school policy stipulated
that students did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
lockers).
96. See generally State v. Stein, 456 P.2d 1, 3 (Kan. 1969) (holding that the right
to inspect a student's locker is vested in the school's adminstrator); Patrick
Y., 358 Md. 50, 67, 746 A.2d 405, 414 (2000) (holding that a state law establishing that students have no expectation of privacy supercede contrary local school policy); Overton, 249 N.E.2d at 368 (holding that students have
no expectation of privacy in a locker because school officials retain control
over it); Isiah B., 500 N.W.2d at 649 (holding that students have no reasonable expectation of privacy when the school has a policy of retaining control
and ownership of the lockers).
97. See Todd Holliday, Comment, Virginia Public Schools- Student Rights, 22 U.
RicH. L. REv. 241, 270-71 (1988).
98. Id. at 271; see also Cass, 709 A.2d at 357 (noting that even though students
do have an expectation of privacy in their lockers, it is minimal because the
school officials possess a master key and their locker combinations must be
kept on file within the school); Overton, 249 N.E.2d at 367 (holding that
because the school possessed a master key, they were empowered to search
the locker).
99. See, e.g., State ex rel T.L.O., 463 A.2d 934, 943 (NJ. 1983), rev'd, New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (noting that a student has the right to believe that a master key will only be used at his "request or convenience").
100. Holliday, supra note 97, at 271; see also Shoemaker, 971 S.W.2d at 182 (holding that a student possessed no expectation of privacy because the locker
was school property). See generally State v. Barrett, 683 So. 2d 331, 340 (La.
Ct. App. 1996) (indicating that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy because the lockers were school property).
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and, consequently, are under the authority of the school officials, it
has been argued that school officials can consent to their search. 101
This argument fails in light of the holding in Katz v. United States, 102
where the Supreme Court determined that the Fourth Amendment
"protects people, not places." 103 Because the locker is not what is protected, the notion that students have no expectation of privacy over
their belongings inside a locker because it is school property is not
reasonable. Accordingly, because the Court in Katz rejected the property-based approach to searches, the fact that a locker is school property should not take away the student's expectation of privacy. 104
A third reason given by courts to support the notion that students
do not have an expectation of privacy in their lockers is the location of
the lockers. 105 Because "[l]ockers are generally located in public areas such as hallways where their contents are exposed to the view of
passersby" 106 the students' expectation of privacy is considered to be
diminished. 107 In other words, these courts argue that if the locker is
open with its "contents exposed," any contraband in plain view could
be seized because of the "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 108 However, this is a defective argument, and a weak attempt to use the "plain view" exception to the
warrant requirement, because the locker is usually closed and locked,
not left open. Thus, simply because the door to the locker is occasionally opened does not mean that the student does not have, or expect,
a right to privacy in the contents of their locker. 109

101. See Black v. Commonwealth, 288 S.E.2d 449, 452 (Va. 1982) ("[T]he consent to search given by one with common authority over property is valid as
against the absent, non-consenting person with whom the authority is
shared.").
102. 389 u.s. 347 (1967).
103. Id. at 351.
104. See id.; see also Berman, supra note 38, at 1104 n.141 (noting that "[g]iven
the Court's rejection of a property-based approach to searches in Katz ...
school ownership of the locker and possession of a master key should not
eviscerate the student's reasonable expectation of privacy").
105. See Holliday, supra note 97, at 271.
106. Richard Delgado, College Searches and Seizures: Students, Privacy, and the Fourth
Amendment, 26 HAsTINGS LJ. 57, 70 (1974).
107. Holliday, supra note 97, at 271.
108. Id. Under the "plain view doctrine," if police are in an area that they are
lawfully permitted to be, and they view an object, if its incriminating character is apparent, they may seize the item without a warrant. Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993); see also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
109. See Holliday, supra note 97, at 271.
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2. Jurisdictions Holding That Students Possess an Expectation of Privacy in School Lockers
Many jurisdictions have held that students possess a privacy interest
within their lockers. 110 Some courts have based that privacy expectation on the assignment of lockers for students' exclusive use. 111 This
exclusive use leads students to expect that they are the only ones who
utilize the locker, and that private belongings may be stored within
the locker. 112 These jurisdictions have also based the student's privacy
interest on the existence of a lock on the outside of the locker. 113 A
lock indicates restricted entry to the locker. 114

IV.

MARYLAND CASES

A.

Student Searches: Diminishing the Right to Privacy

1.

In re Dominic W.

The first case in Maryland to address searches of students by school
officials was In re Dominic W. 115 In this case, a locker was broken into,
and a student informed the assistant principal that he had seen the
defendant and two other students "'hanging around'" the lockers at
approximately the same time the theft occurred.U 6 Based upon this
110. Most of these cases have extended the standard set forth in T.L. 0. to locker
searches. See generally South Carolina v. State, 583 So. 2d 188, 191-92 (Miss.
1991) (applying the T.L.O. standard to hold that students have an expectation ofpnvacy in their lockers); State v. Michael G., 748 P.2d 17, 19 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the T.L. 0. standard of "reasonably suspicious
grounds" applies to searches of students' lockers); In re Adam, 697 N.E.2d
1100, 1107 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (noting that a student's expectation of
privacy is not lost by placing his belongings in a school locker); In re Dumas,
515 A.2d 984, 985 (Pa. 1986) (holding that students have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their locker because they bring many personal items
to school and store them in their lockers); State v. Joseph T., 336 S.E.2d
728, 736-37 (W. Va. 1985) (applying the T.L.O. standard to the locker
search in question and holding that a warrantless search of a student's
locker should be permitted only upon "reasonable suspicion" that the
search will reveal evidence that the student violated the rules of the school
or the law).
111. Berman, supra note 38, at 1104 n.141.
112. !d.
113. !d.
114. See, e.g., Dawson v. State, 868 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tex. App. 1993) (holding
that because the manager did not have a key to the lock on the employee's
locker, and because no other person had access to the locker, the employee
retained an expectation of privacy in her locker, even though it was property of the employer). But see State v. Roseboro, No. CR5-81771, 1990 WL
277237, at *1, *18 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 1990) (noting that employees
had an expectation of privacy in their lockers whether or not there were
locks on them because an "expectation of privacy does not require the maximum security required to prevent break-ins or thefts").
115. 48 Md. App. 236, 426 A.2d 432 (1981).
116. !d. at 237-38, 426 A.2d at 433 (noting that a watch was missing from the
locker).
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information, the assistant principal interviewed the other two students 117 and then questioned the defendant. 118 The assistant principal told the defendant to empty his pockets. 119 Once the defendant
did this, the assistant principal felt and reached into the defendant's
pocket and pulled out a watch. 120 The watch was the one stolen from
the locker. 121
At an adjudicatory hearing, Dominic W. was found to be a delinquent child and was placed on probation. 122 On appeal, Dominic W.
contended that the assistant principal did not have probable cause to
search his pockets, and, therefore, the watch should not have been
admitted into evidence. 123
The court held that section 7-307 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, Education Article, 124 which set forth probable cause as the degree of suspicion needed to effectuate a search within the confines of
the Fourth Amendment, had been violated. 125 Because the assistant
principal did not have probable cause to believe that Dominic W. had
broken into the locker, the evidence gained from Dominick W. was
inadmissible under the exclusionary rule. 126
In 1982, the Maryland General Assembly amended section 7307 (a) 127 to permit searches of students based upon a "reasonable belief' that the student possessed an item of a criminal nature. 128 Upon
amending this statute, the Attorney General of Maryland recognized
that it is constitutional to search students with a standard less than
117. Id. at 238, 426 A.2d at 433. The other two students were questioned and
released after denying involvement. Id.
118. Id. The assistant vice principal took the defendant to an empty classroom
and told the defendant that he was suspected of stealing from the locker.
I d.
119. I d.
120. In re Dominic W., 486 Md. App. 236, 238, 426 A.2d 432, 433 (1981).
121. I d.
122. Id. at 236, 426 A.2d at 433.
123. Id. at 238, 426 A.2d at 434.
124. Mo. ConE ANN., Eouc. § 7-307 (1978) (amended 1982). This section provides in pertinent part:
(a) Authority to search student. - (1) A principal, assistant principal,
or school security guard of a public school may make a reasonable
search of a student on the school premises if he has probable cause
to believe that the student has in his possession an item, the possession of which is a criminal offense under the laws of this State.
Id.; see also supra note 112 and accompanying text.
125. Dominic W, 48 Md. App. at 239, 426 A.2d at 434.
126. I d. The court of special appeals held that even though Maryland does not
have an exclusionary rule, the exclusionary rule is imposed on Maryland
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961); supra note 89 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. This statute was re-codified as
section 7-308 of the Education Article.
128. In re Patrick Y., 358 Md. 50, 65, 746 A.2d 405, 413 (2000) (noting that this
change was the result of the holding in In re Dominic W).
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probable cause. 129 The attorney general, in his opinion, stated that
the majority of jurisdictions have found that the Fourth Amendment
applies in the school setting, but that a standard less rigid than probable cause could be employed. 130 Additionally, the State Board of Education amended its by-laws in 1990 to permit searches based upon a
reasonable belief standard. 131

2.

In re Devon T.

The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, facing similar facts as
Dominic W, 132 but armed with an amended statute, upheld a student
search as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment in In re Devon
T. 133 The court noted that the security guard had "[a] rticulable suspicion" to suspect that Devon T. may have been selling drugs. 134 This
time, the court based its decision on the reasonableness requirement
of New jersey v. T.L. 0. 135 Because the search was conducted by a
school official and not a police officer, 136 and the school had a duty to
protect students, the court in Devon T. held that there only needed to
be reasonable suspicion present before conducting the search. 137 Additionally, the amended statute permitted searches based upon reasonable suspicion alone. 138

B.

Locker Searches in Maryland

The standard in Maryland for locker searches has remained unchanged for twenty-eight years. 139 Since 1973, Maryland has notrequired any determination of probable cause or reasonable suspicion
in order for school officials to search a locker. 140 Maryland's Educa129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

135.
136.
137.

67 Op. Att'y Gen. 147, 150 (1982).
/d. at 149.
See Patrick Y., 358 Md. at 65, 746 A.2d at 413-14.
48 Md. App. 236, 426 A.2d 432 (1981).
85 Md. App. 674, 584 A.2d 1287 (1991). A school security guard searched
the pockets of Devon T. based on a tip from his grandmother and a student
informant that Devon T. was selling drugs. /d. at 701, 584 A.2d at 1300.
/d. at 701, 584 A.2d at 1300. The court stated: "Security guard William Jackson took the complaint from the concerned grandmother that ... a group
of [ ] students from the school were hiding out in her house during the
school day and were selling drugs out of the house." /d. at 701-02, 584 A.2d
at 1300. The security guard was also given information from a reliable student. /d.
469 U.S. 325 (1985). For a further description of this case, see supra Part
III. A.
Devon T., 85 Md. App. at 701, 584 A.2d at 1300.
/d. "Reasonable suspicion" is a lower standard than "articulable suspicion."
/d.

138. See supra note 124 (noting that this statute eventually became section 7-308
of the Education Article).
139. In re Patrick Y., 358 Md. 50, 65, 746 A.2d 405, 413 (2000) (noting that only
stylistic changes were made).
140. See id.
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tion Article section 7-308 requires the school's to announce or publish
notice of the school's right to search lockers. 141 Likewise, in 1997, the
State Board of Education added a provision that authorized school
officials to search lockers with no suspicion of wrongdoing. 142

1.

In re Patrick Y.

The only case that has addressed the issue of locker searches in Maryland is In re Patrick Y. 143 In Patrick Y., the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that neither probable cause nor articulable suspicion is
required before searching a student's locker. 144 In fact, after Patrick
Y., students' lockers can be searched at any time, for any reason, without the student's knowledge.
a.

Facts

Patrick Y. was an eighth grade student at Mark Twain School, a public middle and senior high school in Montgomery County, Maryland.145 On May 23, 1997, an informant told the school security
officer that "'there were drugs and or weapons in the middle school
area of the school.' " 146 Upon being informed, the principal authorized a search of all lockers in the middle school area. 147 The security
officer conducted the search. 148 The facts are not clear as to how
many lockers were searched, how the individuals conducted the
search, or how the security guard gained access to the lockers. 149 The
search did not exceed the scope of the middle school area, and the
school gained access to the lockers without the assistance, permission,
or notification of the students. 150
Upon searching Patrick Y.'s locker, the security guard opened his
book bag, 151 and found a knife, a pager, and a package of rolling papers. 152 When Patrick Y. was confronted with the items found in the
141. Mo. ConE ANN., Eouc. § 7-308(b)(2) (1999). The statute provides that
"[t]he right of the school official to search the locker shall be announced
or published previously in the school." Id.
142. Patrick Y., 358 Md. at 63, 746 A.2d at 412-13 (citing Mo. ConE ANN., Eouc.
§ 7-308); see also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
143. 124 Md. App. 604, 723 A.2d 523 (1999) [hereinafter Patrick 1], a.IJ'd, 358
Md. 50, 746 A.2d 405 (2000) [herinafter Patrick II].
144. Patrick II, 358 Md. at 63, 746 A.2d at 413.
145. Id. at 52, 746 A.2d at 406. Approximately 245 students were identified by
the school as having emotional, learning, social and behavioral difficulties.
!d.
146. Id. at 53, 746 A.2d at 407 (quoting an unknown informant).
147. I d.
148. !d.
149. Patrick II, 358 Md. 50, 53, 746 A.2d 405, 407 (2000).
150. I d.
151. Id. at 53, 746 A.2d at 407. The court noted that because the issue of the
bookbag search was never challenged by the petitioner, it was not addressed by the court. Id. at 54, 746 A.2d at 407.
152. I d.
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book bag, he admitted that they belonged to him. 153 The police
charged Patrick Y. with being a delinquent child. 154

b.

Trial Court

At the adjudicatory hearing, Patrick Y. moved to suppress the items
found in the search. 155 Patrick Y. argued that the school policy statement gave him an expectation of privacy in his locker. 156 Furthermore, Patrick Y. claimed that the search was unreasonable because it
was not based on probable cause as set forth in the school policy. 157
The District Court of Montgomery County, sitting as the juvenile
court, found Patrick Y. guilty of being a delinquent child. 158

c.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland - A Focus on the Search

The first appeal was based upon the denial of the motion to suppress.159 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reviewed the motion and upheld the decision of the trial court, basing its decision on
the reasonableness of the search. 160 The court held that the search
was reasonable, following the Supreme Court decisions of New jersey v.
T.L. 0. 161 and Vernonia School District v. Acton, 162 by balancing the stu153. /d. The court noted that at the time he was confronted with the items,
Patrick Y. was being restrained because he had threatened to leave the
school without permission. /d. Additionally, as noted in the court of special appeals' decision, Patrick Y.'s pager was confiscated when the school
officials confronted him and he was subsequently charged with possession
of a pager, which was a violation of the school policy. Patrick I, 124 Md.
App. 604, 607 n.2, 723 A.2d 523, 525 n.2. (1999).
154. Patrick I, 124 Md. App. at 606, 723 A.2d at 524.
155. /d. at 608, 723 A.2d at 525.
156. /d. The policy provided that the principal or other designated official "may
conduct a search of a student or of the student's locker if there is probable
cause to believe that the student has in his/her possession an item" of contraband. /d. For further discussion of the effect of the school policy, see
infra Part V.B.
157. Patrick/, 124 Md. App. at 608, 723 A.2d at 525.
158. /d. at 606, 723 A.2d at 524. The court noted that if Patrick Y. had been an
adult, he would have been guilty of possession of both a deadly weapon and
a pager on school property. /d.
159. /d. at 606, 723 A.2d at 524.
160. /d. at 616, 723 A.2d at 529.
161. 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985). The Court held that schools may search students
if the search is reasonable rather than if tliere is probable cause. /d.
162. 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995). Acton involved a school policy that required
all students who wished to play sports to be subjected to random drug
urinalysis. /d. at 649-50. The Court in Acton, upholding the reasonableness
of the "search" for drugs in the urinalysis, held that, absent a clear policy,
whether a search is reasonable is based on a balancing of the privacy interests of the individual against a compelling government interest. /d. at 65253. A government interest is compelling when the interest is "impartant
enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of oilier factors that
show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of
privacy.'' /d. at 661.
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dent's privacy interest with the school's need to keep discipline and
order. 163 The court recognized that although the school policy may
have been violated, the school officials were not limited by this policy
when faced with a need to maintain safety. 164 The court also recognized that "courts that have considered whether students have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their lockers have concluded that they
do." 165 Thus, the court of special appeals recognized that Patrick Y.
possessed an expectation of privacy within his locker, but because the
school had reasonable suspicion to believe that there may be drugs in
the locker, the court upheld the search because it was reasonable. 166
d.

Court of Appeals of Maryland - A New Precedent is Set

Mter the court of special appeals denied Patrick Y.'s motion to suppress the evidence, 16 he petitioned the court of appeals for certiorari.168 Patrick Y. raised the issue of whether the search of his locker
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 169 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that because the school policy conflicted with state
law/ 70 it was "invalid and nugatory" 171 and that it could not be the
basis of a student's expectation of privacy within his locker. 172 Additionally, because Maryland law allowed school officials to search lockers without any reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, 173 the court held
that Patrick Y. did not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy
163. Patrick I, 124 Md. App. at 613, 723 A.2d at 528 (1999).
164. Id. at 615-16, 723 A.2d at 529. "The statement, read as a whole, explains the
consequences of students' actions. It does not purport to be a complete
statement of disciplinary policy." Id. at 615-16, 723 A.2d at 529.
165. Id. at 613, 723 A.2d at 528. The court stated: "We agree that students have
an expectation of privacy in their lockers. We have concluded, nonetheless, that under the circumstances of the present case, the school administration's need to protect the safety and well-being of the other students
outweighed appellant's privacy interests." Id. at 616, 723 A.2d at 529.
166. Id. at 616, 723 A.2d at 529.
167. Patrick I, 124 Md. App. at 606, 723 A.2d at 524.
168. Patrick II, 358 Md. at 54, 746 A.2d at 405.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 66, 746 A.2d at 414. The school policy required probable cause
before school officials could conduct a locker search, whereas the state law
did not require the presence of any suspicion before conducting a search.
Id. at 66, 746 A.2d at 414.
171. Id.
172. Id.; see also Mo. ConE ANN., Eouc. § 7-308(b) (1999). Additionally, the court
noted that due to the petitioner's failure to raise the issue of whether the
search was illegal because it violated the school policy, the court did not
consider whether the petitioner was entitled to relief on that basis alone.
Patrick II, 358 Md. at 54, 746 A.2d at 407-08.
173. Mo. ConE ANN., Eouc. § 7-308(b)(1)(1999)The statute provides that "[a]
principal, assistant principal or school security guard of a public school may
make a search of the physical plant of the school and its appurtenances
including the lockers of students." Id.

324

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 31

within his locker. 174 Thus, the court did not consider whether the
search was reasonable. 175

e. Judge Bell's dissent
In the dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Bell first argued that the
school policy gave students an expectation of privacy in their lockers.176 According to Judge Bell, because the students had an expectation of privacy, the search of the lockers by the security guard
constituted a search within the reach of the Fourth Amendment. 177
Consequently, the reasonableness of the search should have been
considered. 178
Second, the dissent noted that the majority relied on one part of
the Maryland statute, but not the second part. 179 Although section 7308(b) (1) granted school officials the authority to search students'
lockers, 180 part two of subsection b stated that "the right of the school
official to search the locker shall be announced or published previously in the school." 181 The majority only addressed this section of
the statute in a footnote, in response to the dissenting opinion, and
opined that the purpose of this subsection was to ensure that students
would be given actual notice of the policy so that they could not claim
a legitimate expectation of privacy. 182
The dissent argued that an alternative interpretation of the statute
provided school officials with the authority to search lockers, but that
the individual schools have the discretion to decide the standard of
the search by publishing or announcing the policy within their
schools. 183 The dissent also acknowledged that to interpret the statute
as the majority did would not make sense, because if subsection b,
part one gave the schools exclusive authority to search lockers, then
there would be no reason for a requirement of prior notice. 184 Like174. Patrick II, 358 Md. at 67, 746 A.2d at 414.
175. /d. at 67, 746 A.2d 414-15.
176. /d. at 73-74, 746 A.2d at 418 (Bell, CJ., dissenting). After discussing cases
in several jurisdictions, the dissent concluded that "[t]he school policy is
thus the standard against which to judge" whether the student has an expectation of privacy within his locker. /d. at 75, 746 A.2d at 419.
177. /d. at 74, 746 A.2d at 418.
178. See id. (noting that "reasonableness of the circumstances" is the standard in
most cases involving student searches).
179. /d. at 76-77, 746 A.2d at 419-20.
180. Mo. ConE ANN., Eouc. § 7-308(b)(1)(1999).
181. /d.§ 7-308(b)(2).
182. Patrick II, 358 Md. at 67 n.2, 746 A.2d at 415 n.2.
183. /d. at 77, 746 A.2d at 420 (Bell, CJ., dissenting).
184. /d. at 76, 746 A.2d at 419-20. The dissent stated:
I believe that a fair reading of that section as a whole is that the
school officials are given the right to search the lockers, but the
extent of that right, the standard to govern the exercise of that
right, is left to the determination of the individual schools, which
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wise, "as the majority opinion makes clear, failure to give the notice
[did] not affect the validity of the search." 185
The third point made by the dissent was that in reaching its decision, the majority did not accept the decision of the court of special
appeals, 186 nor did it entirely reject the petitioner's argument. 187 Instead, the majority formulated a different holding. The majority held
that because the school policy was invalid, it did not give the students
an expectation of privacy in their lockers; the search was legal because
the controlling Maryland statute 188 did not require a standard of reasonableness before a search was conducted. 189 The dissent commented that the majority may have violated Maryland Rule 8-131 (a)
because the argument that the majority raised was never relied upon
by the state and never ruled upon. 190 Additionally, the dissent noted
that the petitioner was never given the opportunity to respond to the
theory set forth by the majority. 191
The dissent makes strong and valid arguments. First, the majority
does not even consider the notion that the students may have relied
on the school policy regarding searches, and that this policy would
have given them an expectation of privacy. 192 Second, the majority
gave greater weight to part one of section 7-308(b) 193 than the rest of
the section and deemed irrelevant the fact that no notice was given 194
prior to the search of Patrick Y. 's locker. 195 Additionally, the majority
argued that the lockers were property of the school and subject to a

185.
186.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

192.
193.
194.
195.

determination is required to "be announced or published previously in the school."
ld. at 77, 746 A.2d at 420.
/d. at 76, 746 A.2d at 420. The dissent further noted a rule of statutory
interpretation, that a statute must not be interpreted rendering any portion
of it meaningless. /d.
/d. at 70, 746 A.2d at 416; see Patrick I, 124 Md. App. 604, 613-14, 723 A.2d
523, 528 (holding that although the student had a privacy interest in his
locker, his privacy interest was outweighed by the need of the school to
maintain order, thus making the search reasonable).
See Patrick II, 358 Md. at 70, 746 A.2d at 416.
Mo. ConE ANN., Eouc. § 7-308(b) (1999).
See Patrick II, 358 Md. at 66-67, 746 A.2d at 414.
/d. at 70 n.5, 746 A.2d at 416 n.5 (Bell, CJ., dissenting); see also Mo. R. 8131 (a).
/d. at 71, 746 A.2d at 417. Because neither of the parties had briefed the
issue and petitioner was afforded no opportunity to respond, Judge Bell
noted that the court should only have decided the issue raised on certiorari. /d. at 71, 746 A.2d at 417.
See id. at 69-70, 746 A.2d at 416.
See id. at 67 n.5, 746 A.2d at 415.
The notice was actually given by the school policy, which was directly opposite of the state law. /d.
See Patrick II, 358 Md. at 66-67, 746 A.2d at 414.

326

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 31

search at any time. 196 All of these factors support the dissent's position "that the school had no right to search" the locker. 197

f

Impact on Maryland Public School Students

Finally, of most significance is how this decision has impacted public school students in Maryland. Because this is a case of first impression in Maryland/ 98 the majority has set the standard for future
school locker searches, giving school officials unlimited authority to
search a student's locker. 199 The standard of reasonable suspicion set
forth in T.L. 0. should apply. As a result of the standard set by Patrick
Y., Maryland courts will not even be able to consider whether the
search was reasonable. 200 Even though the Maryland General Assembly included the "notice" provision in section 7-308 of the Education
Article, courts are likely to ignore this requirement in the same fashion that the court of appeals did. Although schools have a duty to
protect students and enforce discipline, they should not be given such
a broad grant of authority.
V.

A.

MARYLAND STUDENTS SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECTED TO
STANDARDLESS SEARCHES
In re Adam: Similar to, but Better than In re Patrick Y. 201

In re Adam202 involved facts similar to Patrick Y. The student's locker
was searched because of the principal's reasonable suspicion that the
student was smoking marijuana. 203 The principal based his authority
to search the locker on an Ohio statute granting school administrators
the authority to search a student upon reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.204 The Ohio law had an additional provision granting school
officials broad authority to search lockers at anytime, without any suspicion of wrongdoing, but only if the school conspicuously posted a
196. /d. at 63, 746 A.2d at 412-13 (noting that "[n]o probable cause is required;
nor is any reasonable suspicion required").
197. /d. at 79, 746 A.2d at 421 (Bell, CJ., dissenting).
198. To date there have been no other cases discussing student locker searches.
See supra Part 1V.A for a discussion of the standard in Maryland for
searches of a student.
199. Again, as the majority stated in Patrick II, "[n]o probable cause is required;
nor is any reasonable suspicion required." Patrick II, 358 Md. at 63, 746
A.2d at 413.
200. See Patrick II, 358 Md. at 67, 746 A.2d at 414-15 (noting that because they
had determined that Patrick Y. had no reasonable expectation of privacy, a
determination of the reasonableness of the search was unnecessary).
201. See supra Part N.B.1.a.
202. 697 N.E.2d 1100 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
203. /d. at 1102. The principal was acting on information given to him by an
instructor in the program in which the student was enrolled. /d. The inspector reported to the instructor that he had caught the student smoking
cigarettes, and he thought that he smelled marijuana. /d.
204. /d.
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notice of that policy. 205 Although the trial court found that the search
was a reasonable search, it based its finding on the broad authority
given to the school administration to search anytime, for any reason,
which was subsequently declared unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals of Ohio. 206
The Court of Appeals of Ohio noted that other jurisdictions had
held that students possess a privacy expectation in their lockers. 207
Additionally, the court opined that a student's privacy expectations
are not lost by placing her belongings in a locker, 208 and a sign on the
school premises could not take away that expectation of privacy. 209
Finally, the court argued that to take away a juvenile's right to privacy
in her personal things "minimizes the value of our Constitutional freedoms in the minds of our youth." 210 Ultimately, the court upheld the
search as reasonable, but disagreed with the reasoning that the trial
court used to reach its decision. 211
B.

School Policy Creates or Diminishes an Expectation of Privacy

In Patrick Y., Judge Wilner, writing the majority opinion, held that
the school policy requiring school officials to have probable cause
before conducting a search of the students' lockers did not give students an expectation of privacy in their lockers. 212 Patrick Y.'s school,
Mark Twain School, published in their "Policies Regarding Student
Behavior" the following statement:
Mark Twain subscribes to Montgomery County Public
Schools' Search and Seizure policy, which provides that the
principal or the administration's designee may conduct a
205. Id. at 1103; OHIO REv. ConE ANN.§ 3313.20(B)(1) (b) (2001). This statute
gave school officials the authority to:
Search any pupil's locker and the contents of any pupil's locker at
any time if the board of education posts in a conspicuous place in
each school building that has lockers available for use by pupils a
notice that the lockers are the property of the board of education
and that the lockers and the contents of all the lockers are subject
to random search at any time without regard to whether there is a
reasonable suspicion that any locker or its contents contains evidence of a violation of a criminal statute or a school rule.
!d.
206. In re Adam, 697 N.E.2d at 1107. In T.L.O., the court "expressly disavowed
any 'litmus paper test' ... implicating the Fourth Amendment. However,
that is exactly what the Ohio legislature [did] in establishing a rule ...
without regard to the reasonableness standard set forth by the United
States Supreme Court." Id. at 1108.
207. Id. at 1106 (citing Berman, supra note 38, at 1104 n.140).
208. Id. at 1107 (citing Commonwealth v. Cass, 666 A.2d 313, 317 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995)).
209. !d.
210. Id. at 1108.
211. Id.
212. Patrick II, 358 Md. at 66-67, 746 A.2d at 414.
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search of a student or of the student's locker if there is probable cause to believe that the student has in his/her possession
an item, possession of which constitutes a criminal offense
under the laws of the State of Maryland. 213
However, the majority held that this policy was invalid 214 because it
differed from the standard set forth in the Maryland Code 215 and in
the by-laws of the State Board of Education. 216
The majority failed to consider that Patrick Y. may have relied on
the school policy, and that his reliance would have created an expectation of privacy. 217 The school required each student and their parent
to sign the policy for the school's records. 218 This was the school's
method of providing notice to the students that their locker may be
searched, pursuant to Maryland law. 219 It is possible that students, relying on the policy, would assume that their lockers were private unless they were suspected of illegal activities.
The effect of the school policy on a student's expectation of privacy
has not been addressed by Maryland or by the Supreme Court. 220
However, it has been addressed by several other jurisdictions. 221 The
growing trend is for the school policy to set the terms outlining the
extent of the students' expectation of privacy in their lockers. 222
For instance, in Commonwealth v. Snyder, 223 Snyder's locker was
searched after a student reported to a faculty member that Snyder had
tried to sell marijuana to the student. 224 The student told the faculty
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

/d. at 52-53, 746 A.2d at 406-07 (emphasis added).
!d. at 66-67, 746 A.2d at 414.
/d.
/d.

See id. at 74, 746 A.2d at 418 (Bell, CJ., dissenting).
/d. at 73-74, 746 A.2d at 418.
See Mo. ConE ANN., Eouc. § 7-308(b) (2) (1999).
See supra notes 79-83, 220 and accompanying text.
See Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662 (lOth Cir. 1981) (holding that students had no expectation of privacy within their lockers because the school
had a policy of retaining control over the lockers); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363 (Mass. 1992) (holding that the school policy, stating
that students' lockers would not be searched unreasonably, gave students a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their lockers); In re Isiah B., 500
N.W.2d 637 (Wis. 1993) (holding that the school policy stipulated that students did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their lockers).
222. See Commonwealth v. Carey, 554 N.E.2d 1199 (Mass. 1990). "Most courts
agree ... that it is important to consider the effect of the school policy
making the lockers subject to search by administrators." /d. at 1202. But see
State v. Joseph T., 336 S.E.2d 728 (W. Va. 1985). In joseph T., a school
policy was in effect at the time of the alleged illegal search that stipulated
that a search would only be done if "absolutely necessary" and that the officials would have the student present during the search. /d. at 737 n.lO.
Although the state did not follow these procedures, the search was upheld
because it was reasonable. /d.
223. 597 N.E.2d 1363 (Mass. 1992).
224. /d. at 1364.

2002]

No Expectation of Privacy

329

member that Snyder had shown him a video cassette case filled with
three bags of marijuana, and that Snyder had subsequently put the
video cassette case into his book bag. 225
The faculty member reported this to the principal and vice principal.226 Mter consulting with each other, the principal and vice principal decided to wait until Snyder was in class before searching his book
bag. 227 By using the combination to the locker, the principal and vice
principal gained access to, and searched Snyder's locker. 228 In the
locker, they found the book bag, and upon a search of the book bag,
found the video cassette case full of marijuana. 229 As a result of the
search, the principal and vice principal located Snyder, questioned
him, and reported the incident to the police. 230 Snyder was subsequently charged and convicted of possession with intent to distribute
in a school. 231
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated that
"[r]ecent decisions elsewhere have recognized that, barring some express understanding to the contrary, students have a reasonable and
protected expectation of privacy in their school lockers." 232 The
school in this case had a policy "that each student had the right 'not
to have his/her locker subjected to unreasonable search.' "233 The
court held that this assurance from the school gave Snyder an expectation of privacy in his locker. 234 Therefore, he had standing to claim
that the search violated his Fourth Amendment right; however, the
court ultimately held that the school principal had probable cause to
search the locker, rendering the search reasonable. 235
In Zamora v. Pomeroy, 236 the Albuquerque Police Department sent
"'sniffer'" dogs to search school lockers as part of a special investigation.237 The dogs, upon sniffing Zamora's locker, indicated that there
were drugs inside. 238 Without a warrant, police opened the locker
and found marijuana. 239 Subsequently, Zamora was transferred to another school. 240
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1365.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1366 (emphasis added).
Id. (quoting the school administration's policy regarding locker searches).
Id.
Id. at 1366-67.
639 F.2d 662 (lOth Cir. 1981).
Id. at 663.
Id. at 664.
Id.
!d. at 664-65. Zamora argued that his transfer to another school constituted
an expulsion. Id. The school to which Zamora was transferred had a lower
academic reputation than did the school he currently attended. Id.
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Zamora filed suit against the high school officials who conducted
the search, claiming that police had violated his civil rights. 241 Summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendant. 242
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged a school policy articulated in the student handbook, in which the schools gave notice of
their right to inspect lockers at any time. 243 Because the school had
reserved the right to inspect lockers, the court concluded that the
search was legal due to the probability that there was contraband inside the locker. 244
Likewise, the Court of Appeals of Texas in Shoemaker v. State 245 held
that the policy published in the school handbook put students on notice that their lockers could be searched at any time without their
presence, if reasonable cause existed. 246 Therefore, the court concluded that Shoemaker did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in her school locker. 247 The court, adhering to the two-part test
set forth in New jersey v. T.L.0., 248 determined that the initial search of
Shoemaker's locker was both 'justified at its inception" and "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying the interference in
the first place." 249 Although the court did not need to examine the
reasonableness of the search because it had determined that Shoemaker did not possess a privacy interest, the court still concluded that
the search was reasonable.
Another case that demonstrated the significance placed upon a
school policy was In re Isiah B. 250 In that case, the Milwaukee Public
School System announced a policy that the lockers belonged to the
school, and that the school had control over the lockers. 251 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that this policy, and notice of this policy to students, afforded no reasonable expectation of privacy to
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

251.

!d. at 663.
!d. at 667.
!d. at 665.
Id. at 670.
971 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. App. 1998). Shoemaker was suspected of stealing
credit cards from the assistant principal's purse. !d. at 180. The assistant
principal used a master key to open and search Shoemaker's locker and
found the credit cards in her locker. !d.
!d. at 182. The policy stipulated that the locker remained under the control of the school. !d. Additionally, the assistant principal had a key capable of opening all of the lockers. Id.
!d. at 182.
469 u.s. 325 (1985).
Shoemaker, 971 S.W.2d at 341 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20
(1968)).
500 N.W.2d 637 (Wis. 1993). After several incidents of gunfire and gun
sightings at school and at school functions, the principal ordered the
school security to randomly search students' lockers. !d. at 638. When the
security official opened Isiah 's locker, he found a coat with a gun and cocaine in the pocket. !d. at 639.
!d.
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students in their lockers. 252 The court further stated that without
such a locker policy, students might have a lowered expectation of
privacy in their lockers. 253 Because Isiah B. did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his locker, there was no Fourth Amendment
violation. 254
While there exists no case directly on point that explicitly proves
the argument, the thesis of this Comment may be proven through
negative implication. Focusing on numerous cases that take away a
student's expectation of privacy based on a school policy, 255 by reverse
analogy, a school policy should be able to give a student a greater
expectation of privacy. 256 Additionally, the fact that the policy in Patrick Y. required the signature of both the student and parent257 further demonstrates that the policy dictated the means by which school
searches would be effectuated.
Some courts have held that even if the government had a policy
explicitly permitting continuous searches, people would still have a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 258 The knowledge that one could
be the target of a search does not take away that person's expectation
of privacy. 259

C.

The Court of Appeals of Maryland's Interpretation of Section 7-308(b) of
the Education Article is Inconsistent with Traditional Rules of Statutory
Construction

Another problem with the court's reasoning in In re Patrick Y. 260 is
that it only addresses subsection (1) of the Maryland Code, Education
Article section 7-308. 261 Subsection (1) gives school officials authority
252. /d. at 641.
253. !d.
254. /d. Thus, the gun and cocaine were admissible, and the court upheld
Isiah's conviction. /d.
255. See supra Part V.B and accompanying text.
256. See generally Snyder, 597 N.E.2d at 1366 (stating that the "school administration explicitly acknowledged in the students' rights and responsibility code
that each student had the right '[n]ot to have his/her locker subjected to
unreasonable search'").
257. Patrick II, 358 Md. at 52, 746 A.2d at 406.
258. See Jones v. Latexo Indep. Sch. Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 234 (E.D. Tex. 1980)
(noting that "if the Government announced that all telephone lines would
henceforth be tapped, it is apparent that, nevertheless, the public would
not lose its expectation of privacy in using the telephone"); see also United
States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893,905 (9th Cir. 1973) (stating that "[t]he government could not avoid the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment by notifying the public that all telephone lines would be tapped or that all homes
would be searched").
259. See generally Jeffers v. Heavrin, 701 F. Supp. 1316, 1321 (W.D. Ky. 1988),
rev'd, 932 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1991).
260. 358 Md. 50, 746 A.2d 405 (2000).
261. MD. CoDE ANN., EDuc. § 7-308(b). The section states that:
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to search students' lockers. 262 Subsection (b) (2) stipulates that the
authority of the school officials to search the locker must be published
or announced in the school. 263 The majority in Patrick Y. only addressed this section in a footnote. 264 If the school policy was held to
be invalid, this requirement in the statute was not met and the evidence could not have been admitted because Patrick Y. would not
have been given proper notice through publication or announcement
pursuant to the provisions of this section. 265 Additionally, to ignore
this provision of the statute is to give the school officials unlimited
discretion to search students' lockers. The legislature did not enact
this provision for it to be disregarded. As Chief Judge Bell argued in
his dissent: "Invoking the right post hoc is not only unfair under the
circumstances, but it violates what is unambiguously the language of
the statute and thus the intent of the Legislature." 266
It is well settled in Maryland that all parts of a statute should be read
and considered together. 267 All parts of a statute should be given effect so that the objective of .the legislature may be met. 268 Under this
view, each part of section 7-308 has a specific purpose in order to accomplish the legislature's goals. 269
(1) A principal, assistant principal, or school security guard of a

public school may make a search of the physical plant of the
school and its appurtenances including the lockers of students.
(2) The right of the school official to search the locker shall be
announced or published previously in the school.
!d.
262. !d.§ 7-308(b)(1).
263. !d. § 7-308(b)(2).
264. Patrick II, 358 Md. at 68 n.2, 746 A.2d at 415 n.2. In this footnote, the
majority construed subsection (b) (2) as giving notice of the policy to "eliminate any basis for an expectation of privacy." !d.
265. !d. at 79, 746 A.2d at 421 (Bell, CJ., dissenting) (noting that, technically,
notice was never actually given because the notice in the school policy was
actually the opposite of the state policy).
266. !d.
267. !d. at 77, 746 A.2d at 420 (quoting Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bell AtlanticMaryland, Inc., 346 Md. 160, 178, 695 A.2d 171, 180 ( 1997)). The Court of
Appeals of Maryland has stated that " [w]hen interpreting any statute, [the
court] must look to the entire statutory scheme, and not [to] any one provision in isolation, to effect the statute's general policies and purposes." Bell
Atlantic, 346 Md. at 178, 695 A.2d at 180 (citing Morris v. Osmose Wood
Preserving, 340 Md. 519,539,667 A.2d 624, 634 (1995); City of Annapolis v.
State, 30 Md. 112, 117 (1869)); see also Maryland Div. of Labor & Indus. v.
Triangle Gen. Contractors, Inc., 366 Md. 407, 425-26, 784 A.2d 534, 545
(noting that "it is a natural presumption that the legislature does not intend to use words in vain or to leave a part of its enactment without sense
or meaning but intends that every part of it shall be operative" (quoting
Welshe v. Kuntz, 196 Md. 86, 98, 75 A.2d 343, 348 (1950)).
268. Patrick II, 358 Md. at 77-78, 746 A.2d at 420. The court stated that "[a]ll
parts of a statute are to be read together to determine intent, and reconciled and harmonized to the extent possible." !d. (quoting Wheeler v.
State, 281 Md. 593, 596, 380 A.2d 1052, 1055 (1977).
269. !d.
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The dissent interprets part two of section 7-308(b) as allowing
schools to determine, on a school-by-school basis, the applicable standard for locker searches. 270 However, the majority opined that section 7-308 was established to provide a uniform policy for searches. 271
To hold otherwise, according to the majority, would create confusion.272 Yet, it causes more confusion to have a student sign a school
search policy and then to declare the policy invalid. It also is more
confusing to insist that students be aware of state law as opposed to
the school policy given to them in writing to sign. By disregarding an
important provision of the statute, the majority strayed from rules of
statutory construction. 273 From the plain language of section 7308(b) (2), the Maryland General Assembly intended that notice be
given before a search was effectuated. 274 With no standard governing
school officials' searches of lockers, and no procedural safeguards,
Maryland has subjected students to unregulated locker searches.
The court in In re Patrick Y. held that the county policy was contrary
to that of the state policy, and thus, was invalid. 275 However, section 4401 of the Education Article vested control of any educational matters
affecting the county in the control of the County Board of Education.276 Patrick Y. held that even though the counties do have this
authority, each county's authority is subject to the authority of the
State Board of Education and the Maryland General Assembly. 277 The
missing link in the majority's reasoning is how students would know
which law applied to them. If subsection b, part 2 of section 7-308278
is so insignificant that the majority of the court of appeals does not
require it, and a school policy will not take precedence over it, then
students will never know that the school officials can search their lockers for no reason. If the student is given a school policy and is required to sign it, the student will most likely assume that his locker is
subject to the constraints of that policy.
D.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland's Decision is a Better Decision

The decision reached by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland279 would have been better precedent for Maryland public school
students. The court of special appeals at least recognized that stu270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

!d. at 78, 746 A.2d at 421.
Id. at 68 n.2, 746 A.2d at 415 n.2.
!d.
See supra Part V.C.l.
See Mn. ConE ANN., Enuc. § 7-308(b) (2).
Patrick II, 358 Md. at 66, 746 A.2d at 414.
See Mn.ConE ANN., Enuc. §4-101(a).
Patrick II, 358 Md. at 66, 746 A.2d at 414.
Mn. ConE ANN., Enuc. § 7-308(b).
See Patrick I, 124 Md. App. 604, 723 A.2d 525 (1999), affd, 358 Md. 50, 746
A.2d 405 (2000). See also supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the court of special appeals' decision in Patrick I.
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dents have a legitimate expectation of privacy within their lockers. 280
But, the court also recognized that when there are legitimate, compelling governmental interests that outweigh the privacy interests of the
individual, the search will be upheld as reasonable. 281 Thus, the court
followed recent Supreme Court decisions regarding student
searches 282 and kept in line with Maryland law. 283
The court of appeals, however, never considered the reasonableness of the search. By setting no boundaries by which school officials
may search, the court of appeals has diminished the rights of public
school students in Maryland, increased the authority of school officials, and taken away any recourse the student may have to assert her
Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, a principal in Maryland could
search one student's locker every day, having no suspicion and giving
no explanation, and the student would have no recourse if she wanted
to stop the searches.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although this Comment does not propose to establish probable
cause as the standard for searching lockers, there is a need for a reasonable suspicion standard. Without any standard, school administrators can execute random, suspicionless searches. 284 These are the
types of searches that the Framers of the Constitution intended to prevent. Consequently, allowing these types of searches will create a
prison-like environment in the schools that is not conducive to
learning. 285
There is no doubt that schools have a responsibility to maintain discipline, but this responsibility should not place the schools outside of
the reach of the Constitution. 286
If there were an actual emergency in the school, a standardless
search would be constitutionally permissible. 287 However, without exigent circumstances, a standardless search is intrusive. 288 Instead,
school officials should only search when there is reasonable suspicion
that a student may have items that are criminal in nature in her
280. Patrick I, 124 Md. App. at 613-14, 723 A.2d at 528.
281. Id.
282. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (holding that whether
a search meets the reasonableness standard is judged by balancing the privacy interests of the student against the governmental interests); see also
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by public school officials).
283. Mo.CooE ANN., Eouc. § 7-308(b).
284. Sef! supra note 199 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
288. See supra Part V.B.
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locker. This method complies more with the Supreme Court's decision in New jersey v. T.L. 0. 289
Finally, Maryland is in the minority among other states regarding
locker searches. 290 There are few states that deny students all privacy
rights in their lockers. 291 The Court of Appeals of Maryland should
take this into consideration because its views are inconsistent with the
majority of other jurisdictions.
After Patrick Y., Maryland has stripped children of their already limited constitutional rights. This is probably the result of fear, based on
the increase in school violence and drug use. 292 While this Comment
acknowledges the need for flexible discipline, the integrity of students
must also be preserved. It is essential to have procedural safeguards to
protect children against unnecessary searches. For "the situation is
not so dire that students in schools may claim no legitimate expectation of privacy." 293
Rebecca N. Cordero

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

469

u.s.

325 (1985).

See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.B.2.
See supra Part I.

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985).

